



1 Russell's theory of quantication before \On Denoting"
Russell's famous paper of 1905 \On Denoting" is a document which shows
that he nally arrived at the conception of quanticational logic which is still
standard today. Before that paper there had been several attempts at the
treatment of quantication; the most well-known among them is contained
in a chapter called \Denoting" of The Principles of Mathematics , which
was published in 1903 (this work will be referred as The Principles in the
following). In moving from this chapter to the 1905 paper, Russell had
changed some of the explanatory agenda and discarded many ideas found in
the earlier treatment.
Today I would like to look at one aspect of the earlier treatment which
shows the striking contrast to the later one, namely the attitudes to the
distinction between plural and singular expressions.
There are at least two reasons why it is worthwhile to look at the earlier
Russell's attitudes to the singular-plural distinction. One of them is histor-
ical; for any concept, it is always both interesting and instructive to see in
detail how the present conception of it was prepared in the past; in the his-
tory of a concept, sometimes we can discern the possibilities which were felt
only vaguely and left unexplored as well as some deadends. The talk about
the unexplored possibilities brings us to another reason why we should look
again at Russell's 1903 treatment of quantication; there is now an intensive
research done in the logic of plurality; we have now several systems of plural
logic and many theories in formal semantics whose aim is to describe and
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explain the linguistic phenomena concerning plurality. It has been said that
Russell's treatment of quantication in The Principles was full of various
mistakes and obscurities, and it cannot be denied that such a ciriticism has
no grounds; but, we can nd there an awareness of some data and problems
which became invisible later, because these data and problems came to be re-
garded peripheral after the standard conception of quanticational logic took
roots; and, some of those are concerned with plurality. Now it has become
more and more apparent that we should be free from the long-held belief
in philosophy that rst-order predicate logic is all there is to logic, some of
Russell's remarks in The Principles can be seen in a new and positive light,
namely, as one of the early attempts at a more comprehensive treatment of
quantication.
2 \All" and \every": plural vs. singular quantication
The chapter on denoting in The Principles is concerned with a class of ex-
pressions Russell calls \a denoting phrase"; it is characterized as a common
noun preceded by \all," \every," \any," \a," \some," or \the" (and some
synonym of it) 1 Hence, the following are all denoting phrases;
all men, every man, any man, a man, some man, the man
Turning to the 1905 paper, we nd it begins with the sentence
By a `denoting phrase' I mean a phrase such as any one of the
following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the
present King of England, the present King of France, the centre
of mass of the Solar System at the rst instant of the twentieth
century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the revolution
of the sun round the earth 2 .
We see that a \denoting phrase" covers the same range of English expres-
sions in both accounts; however, the phrases whose semantics were sharply
1 B.Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, p.56. Russell's terminology for what we
call here a \common noun\ is a \class-concept"; according to him, \human" is a predicate
and \man" is a class-concept, although \the distinction is perhaps verbal." What Russell
counts as a synonym among the expressions which does not have the form specied here
is not very clear. Probably \each N" might be a synonym of \every N."
2 B.Russell, Essays in Analysis, edited by D.Lackey, 1973, p.103.
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distinguished from each other in the earlier account, became assimilated in
the later account: whereas \all men," \every man," and \any man" were all
given a dierent semantic explanation in 1903, two years later in 1905 these
three were all considered to be semantically equivalent. For example, after
stating that
`C(all men)' means ` \If x is human, then C(x) is true" is always
true'.
he says
`C(every man)' will mean the same as `C(all men)'. 3
This statement should be surprising to a reader of The Principles , for \ev-
ery man" and \all men" were treated as a contrasting pair and given entirely
dierent semantic accounts there; whereas \all" was explained in terms of
what Russell called a \numerical conjunction," the sentence containing \ev-
ery" was explained by an equivalence to some propositional conjunction of its
instances. For example, if our domain were to include only two men, namely,
Brown and Jones, then \all men laughed" would be equivalent to
(1) Brown and Jones laughed
and \every man laughed" would be equivalent to
(2) Brown laughed and Jones laughed.
In this particular case, there seems to be no dierence in truth condition
between \all men laughed" and \every man laughed" because (1) and (2)
are equivalent to each other. However, if we consider a pair of sentences like
Russell's own examples
(3) Brown and Jones are two of Miss Smith's suitors.
(4) Brown and Jones are paying court to Miss Smith.
we notice immediately that, whereas (4) is equivalent to
3 Essays in Analysis, p.106. Although there is no explicit statement to the eect that
`C(any man)' means the same as `C(all men)' (or `C(every man)'), the very lack of any
statement in that matter suggests that it might be so.
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(5) Brown is paying court to Miss Smith and Jones is paying
court to Miss Smith.
we will not nd any such equivalent sentence easily for (3) 4 ; as Russell
wrote, \it is Brown and Jones who are two, and this is not true of either sep-
arately." 5 He described the dierence between (3) and (4) in the following
way:
the rst case [=(3)] concerned all of them [= Brown and Jones]
collectively, while the second [=(4)] concerns all distributively,
i.e. each or every one of them. 6
It is interesting to note that Russell's use of \collective" and \distributive"
is just the same as the one that is now standard in the literature. As this
quotation from Russell itself shows, \all" can be used either collectively or
distributively. Whereas \all" in (3) is collective, \all" in (1) is distributive.
What distinguishes the distributive use of \all" is that the sentence in which
it occurs is equivalent to a conjunction of some singular sentences; remember
that \all men laughed" would be equivalent to \Brown laughed and Jones
laughed" if there were no men except Brown and Jones.
Although the Russell of 1903 did not express the matter in this way, it
can be said that in general there are two kinds of quantication, namely,
a singular quantication and a plural quantication; to the former belong
\every" (and \each" and \any") and \all" used distributively, and to the
latter belongs the collective \all." A sentence with singular quantication
is either a grammatically singular sentence such as \Every man laughed" or
equivalent to a conjunction of singular sentences just as it is the case with
\All men laughed" when the domain of \men" is nite. In contrast to this, a
sentence with the collective \all" like \All men met in an assembly" cannot
be reduced to any singular sentences; the plurality is essential to it 7 .
4 Later we will see that there is such a sentence after all.
5 The Principles, p.57.
6 Ibid.
7 Can we nd the two kinds of quantication even in a language like Japanese which does
not have any systematic distinction between singular and plural? It might be said that, of
the following pair of sentences, the former involves collective quantication, whereas the
latter involves distributive quantication:
(a) Gakusei-wa minna waratta.
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In the 1905 paper we nd no mention of the distinction between the col-
lective and distributive \all"; the essentially plural constructions like \Brown
and Jones are two of Miss Smith's suitors" or \All men met in an assembly"
made no appearance in it either. But, back in 1903, Russell had many things
to say about the collective \all" and plurality in general. Let us turn to
them.
3 Plurality and classes as many
In The Principles , the chapter on classes comes just after the one on denoting.
In the summary of this chapter, Russell characterized a class thus:
All classes, whether nite or innite, can be obtained as the ob-
jects denoted by the plurals of class-concepts|men, numbers,
points, etc. 8
In the scheme of The Principles there is nothing linguistic in the denoting
relation; it holds between some concepts called \denoting concepts" and
objects; moreover, Russell's \object" surprisingly covers both singular and
plural, and hence it is the word with the widest extension, though it is very
doubtful such a usage is at all coherent, as Russell himself admits 9 . With
these terminological matters in mind, we should note that (i) a class need not
be a single thing, even though its linguistic representation inevitably makes
it a single thing, and that (ii) \the plurals of class-concepts" does not refer
to any linguistic items but the essentially non-linguistic items; but, it is not
hard to nd the linguistic items corresponding to these non-linguistic items:
they are the common nouns in plural, such as \men," \numbers," \points"
and the like, just as the above quotaion shows.
(b) Dono gakusei mo waratta.
However, we should consider more data before we will be able to get any conclusion,
in particular, we should ask whether there is any good argument for the singularity of
\gakusei" in (b).
8 The Principles, p.80.
9 \I shall use the word object in a wider sense than term, to cover both singular and
plural, and also cases of ambiguity as \a man." The fact a word can be framed with a
wider meaning than term raises grave logical problems." (The Principles, p.55, footnote.)
However, in a place about 10 pages earlier (p.43), Russell had said that \term" was the
widest word in the philosophical vocaburary.
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Classes can be also characterized as the objects denoted by the denoting
concepts indicated by the denoting phrases of the form \all u's," since \all
u's" is synonymous with \u's" according to Russell 10 . Therefore, the
concept of plurality is involved both in the analysis of classes and that of
quantication with \all"; Russell thought that both raised the same problem,
namely, \the meaning of the plural" 11 .
What he wanted to maintain in the chapter on classes of The Principles
was that classes were essentially plural objects, provided that \object" is
understood as having the very peculiar (and doubutfully coherent) sense of
his. Within The Principles such plural objects were already introduced in
the preceding chapter on denoting: they are the objects denoted by the
denoting concept all a's , and called the numeral conjunctions of terms. We
encountered one example of them before in the sentence (3) [= Brown and
Jones are two of Miss Smith's suitors], where \Brown and Jones" refers to
(or, indicates, as Russell says) a class and it is a numerical conjunction of
Brown and Jones. Although this is an example of a nite class, Russell
did not think the matter was logically dierent in an innite class 12 , and
concentrated on the nite cases.
Suppose there are only three students A, B, and C, and all of them came
together to the party; then, we can describe this situation by a sentence
(6) All students came together to the party.
According to Russell's theory, \all students" in this situation denotes (or,
indicates a denoting concept that denotes, to be more exact|in the following,
I also use \denote" in such a loose way) a numerical conjunction of A, B, and
C. Thus, the same situation can be also described by the following sentence:
(7) A, B, and C came together to the party.
10 The Principles, pp.67, 72.
11 The Principles, p.72.
12 Characteristically, he writes thus:
I believe this distinction [= dene a class either by enumerating its members
or by specifying its dening property] to be purely psychological: logically,
the extensional denition appears to be equally applicable to innite classes,
but practically, if we were to attempt it, Death would cut short our laudable
endeavour before it had attained its goal. (The Principles, p.69.)
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In Russell's theory, a numerical conjunction of A, B, and C is nothing but the
class of A, B, and C. His question is whether such a class is to be regarded as
one or many. The following quotation shows very well the dilemma Russell
found himself
Taking the class as equivalent simply to the numerical conjunction
\A and B and C and etc.," it seems plain that it is many; yet it
is quite necessary that we should be able to count classes as one
each, and we do habitually speak of a class. Thus classes would
seem to be one in one sense and many in another. 13
It might be thought that there is one possibility Russell failed to consider,
namely, the possibility that \A, B and C" in (7) might not be a semantical
unit. In that case, (7) would express a 3-term relation holding between A,
B and C, and the \and" between B and C would function as a punctuation
mark. But I think it is not hard to see why Russell did not bother to consider
this possibility; rstly, he thought that, in the described situation, \A, B and
C" refers to the object (in Russell's sense) denoted by \all students"; secondly
it seems obvious that any expression which refers to some object constitutes
a semantic unit 14 .
On the assumptions that \A, B and C" in (7) consitutes a semantic unit,
and that what this semantic unit does is referring to a Russelian \object,"
the question is whether \A, B and C" refers to many things or not. Russell
thought that a positive answer to this question led one to the idea of a class
as many, and a negative answer led to the idea of a class as one. We can also
reformulate this question as the one asking whether \A, B and C" is a plural
term which has plural reference or it is a singular term which has singular
reference. I believe Russell's struggles to make sense of the idea of a class as
many in The Principles can be interpreted as the struggles to make sense of
the idea of plural reference.
13 The Principles, p.76
14 One may think, even if we drop the assumption that \all students" denotes an object
just as Russell himself did in 1905, there is no future for this option. For, if (7) contained
a 3-place predicate such as \x, y and z came together to the party," then we would need
a countably innite number of primitive predicates, as there is no limit in the number
of people who can come together. This is obviously absurd. However, this is rather a
short-sighted reaction, because there is now an option of admitting multigrade predicates.
See A.Oliver and T.Smiley, \Multigrade Predicates" Mind 113 (2004).
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4 The discovery of logical form and the disappearance of plurality
There is a remark in The Principles which could be regarded as a method-
ological principle guiding Russell's thinking in this period.
On the whole, grammar seems to me to bring us much nearer to
a correct logic than the current opinions of philosophers; and in
what follows, grammar, though not our master, will yet be taken
as our guide. 15
As is well known, after \On Denoting" Russell ceased to have such a
high opinion of grammar. Instead, he came to the conclusion that grammar
stood almost always as an obstacle for a philosopher to discover the truth.
Thus, the logical form of a sentence had to be distinguished sharply from its
grammatical form.
However, what is called \the logical form of a sentence" is nothing but
a translation of the original sentence into some logical language; for Russell,
it was the language of Principia Mathematica, and for later philosophers,
especially those inuenced by Quine, it is the language of rst-order predicate
logic. So, the grammatical constructions which have no counterparts in such
a logical language were either paraphrased away or just ignored. We can
see the working of such a strategy in the case of plurals. On one hand,
some plural constructions like distributive \all" are paraphrased in terms of
singular constructions as a matter of course. Even Russell's \Brown and
Jones are two of Miss Smith's suitors" (=(3)) can be paraphrased into a
sentence which has no plural constructions. It is equivalent to the following.
Brown is Miss Smith's suitor, and Jones is Miss Smith's suitor,
and Brown is not identical with Jones
On the other hand, the fact that we never meet such a sentence like \All
students met at an assembly" in a standard textbook of logic, shows that
such plural constructions which cannot be easily paraphrased away are just
ignored.
We can see the early signs of such a tendency in Russell's writings after
\On Denoting"; in them, a plural \all" quantication was always assimilated
to a singular \every" quantication, and it was not mentioned that there
15 The Principles, p.42.
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were cases of plural quantication that could not be so assimilated; it is a
signicant fact that a sentence such as \Brown and Jones are two" did not
make appearance in Russell's later writings.
There is one striking example of such a disregard of plural in Introduction
to Mathematical Philosophy of 1919; in a passage where Russell was explain-
ing how traditional term logic could be reformulated in terms of propositional
functions, he wrote \all S is P" instead of \all S are P" or \all S's are P,"
even though he gave \men" as an example of S 16 .
16 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy , p.161.
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